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SUSTAINABLE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
HE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY:  
EVIDENCE FROM GREECE 
Boucas, Dimitris, Information Systems and Innovation Group, London School of Economics, 
Houghton Street, New Academic Building, London WC2A 2AE, UK, d.boucas@lse.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Drawing on recent theorisations on the information society/knowledge-based economy (IS/KBE) and the 
transformation of the roles and functions of the nation-state, the paper argues for the importance of the 
state and its mechanisms for the sustainability of the IS/KBE.  In doing so, it supports the claim in the 
literature, also proven by the empirical reality in different national contexts) that the state has been 
transformed towards a generic model of ‘competition state’ involved in the establishment of the IS/KBE 
paradigm. Nonetheless, surpassing this model, this paper argues that the state is called upon to operate 
also in a developmental way, at least in certain national contexts, if a sustainable IS/KBE is to be achieved. 
The paper draws on the Greek IS/KBE case so as to assess these competition and developmental state 
aspects. 
Keywords: Information society, State, Policy, Greece 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the nation-state has been associated firstly with the security of the community defined by its 
borders and secondly with creating the conditions for economic and social reproduction. This has involved 
guaranteeing property rights, developing legal and monetary systems; regulating the economy and 
ensuring the availability of labour force; providing infrastructures (water, roads, railways, electricity etc); 
caring for those at a disadvantage or in need through social policies (Perrons 2004).  
Globalisation literature has dealt extensively over the last two decades or so with the challenges facing the 
nation-state as a result of pressures emanating from global processes (McGrew 1992). The national state is 
being predominantly regarded as too small to address the global context, but also too big to see to 
increasingly complex and differentiated local problems, as Daniel Bell has remarked in his The End of 
Ideology (Bell 1988). Hyperglobalists argue that the nation-state is a political entity not capable any longer 
to address the challenges presented by economic globalization. They subscribe to the argument of the 
‘retreat of the state’ from the national and international political scene. Arguments on the impact of 
economic globalisation on state authority have emphasised the increasing possibilities for cross-border 
economic activity (facilitated by ICT developments) that escapes state control and regulation.  
There have indeed been extensive debates on the ways in which the ICT-enabled flows and the rise of the 
cyberspace (including the Internet) put into question the notion of state boundaries and the ability of states 
to control such information flows. Law enforcement and taxation of electronic commerce are two of the 
challenges that states seem to face. In international relations, neo-realists stress threats to national 
security and the formation of online communities that operate in parallel with state authority as further 
dimensions of the new state of affairs. In political sociology, ICTs are said to annihilate time and space and 
transform the landscape of power away from the state, as social movements and a number of actors 
broadly belonging to civil society are given the opportunity to become politically active using new 
technologies and thus resist established power arrangements, expressing identity and engaging in new 
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forms of politics (Sassen 2002). Power is seen in these approaches as embedded in the practices, which, 
reproduced over time and space, constitute the material social structures of the information age (Nash 
2000), and is linked with the capacity to control global networks, which are put to different uses (Castells 
1996, 1998).  
Sceptics have offered counter-arguments regarding the actual share and relative weight of cross-border 
compared to economic activity taking place within the limits of national economies and have come up with 
evidence that the latter seems still to play a much greater part than the former. Some of them refuse to 
acknowledge the effects of globalization (which they see as an ongoing process that has been evolving for 
centuries) and downplay the ostensible transformations of the roles and power of states, preferring to 
stress its continuing significance in a number of issues determining national and international politics (Hirst 
and Thompson 1999).  
Other critical approaches argue that against new structural forces (new ICTs, neo-liberal discourses, or new 
geopolitical configurations) and in the light of varying responses to these challenges, a general model of the 
national state still persists as a significant actor in global processes and their national expressions, albeit 
through a rearticulation of its various functions and roles (Smith et al 1999; Mittelman 2000; Sklair 2000). 
They claim, for instance, that while indeed there have been significant processes of liberalisation 
worldwide, these developments are more moves towards re-regulation and regulatory reform, rather than 
simple de-regulation processes (May 2002). The implications for state mechanisms seem to have included 
shifts to new practices, roles and functions and new areas of regulation, rather than the diminishing of 
state roles as such; a model of regulatory state has been proposed to account for these changes (Thatcher 
2002). 
Critical approaches, then, stress the continuing relevance of the state as mediator between international 
flows and national contexts, as a mechanism for integrating the national economy and polity into global 
arrangements and as a link between the rise of sub-national actors and the intensification of supranational 
arrangements. In this respect, the national state retains considerable capacities, in strategic terms in 
domains like the economy, in political terms as guarantor and defendant of the rights of its citizens, and in 
socio-cultural terms as intermediary between global processes and national or local social and cultural 
particularities. 
Notwithstanding the perceived threat of ICTs for state sovereignty, the relationship between ICTs and the 
state is complex and multifaceted; importantly, the advent of the information society and the knowledge-
based economy (IS/KBE) as a set of new societal arrangements has implications for the role of the state, 
redefining it in line with new demands for economic reproduction, governance, social cohesion and social 
sustainability.  
2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE AND THE IS/KBE 
Just as the state established market society in the 19th century (Polanyi 1957), under globalisation the 
contemporary state is being instrumental in the realisation of a framework for the operation of the 
capitalist system in the 21st century. For Steinberg and McDowell, the emerging information society is not 
so a matter of the technological imperatives of ICTs, but rather of the policies of leading states (and 
international institutions) seeking to reconcile capital’s mobility demands (translated in the growth of the 
world economy through the annihilation of space), with capital’s fixity requirements (resulting in increased 
production within state boundaries). According to them, both state and non-state institutions are 
constantly reconfigured by new modes and degrees of communication, without however information flows 
challenging the system of state and non-state entities; nonetheless, such changes lead to struggles for the 
design of new governance and regulatory regimes (Steinberg and McDowell 2003, pp.216-217).  
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Barry also sees a reconfiguration of the space of government due to the centrality of technology in 
contemporary society and conceptualises the practice of government as operating ‘not just in relation to 
spaces defined and demarcated by geographical or territorial boundaries but in relation to zones formed 
through the circulation of technical practices and devices’ adopting practices ‘oriented towards the 
problems of defending, connecting, and reconstructing such technological spaces’ (Barry 2001, p.3). In this 
respect, the promotion of information society through the diffusion of ICTs in the national context can be 
seen as a top-down attempt to ‘produce’ informational capitalism as a transnational ‘space’ that is to be 
governed. 
If governance is the framework in which a 21st-century national state will be functioning and if this 
governance regime involves ICTs and the information society at large then the extent and type of state 
involvement in the governance of the emerging information society becomes a central question for 
research. 
2.1 The Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime and the competition state 
Jessop (2002, 2005) has provided possibly the most comprehensive framework outlining the ways in which 
the contemporary state is linked with the emerging IS/KBE, its transformations, as well as its new forms and 
functions.  
In agreement with other thinkers, Jessop views the various forms of post-WWII welfare capitalism and the 
social democratic political regimes in Europe as supportive of the Fordist regime of accumulation, which 
was established in Western Europe, North America and Australia roughly from 1945-1975 and has been 
essentially a paradigm based on industrial mass-production and mass consumption coupled with a mode of 
socio-economic regulation which took place within the national frame (comprising the national economy, 
national state, national citizenship and national society). He then identifies a contemporary economic and 
social transformation towards a new, post-Fordist accumulation regime, which has been emerging in the 
1990s through political strategies towards the establishment of a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational 
Regime (SWPR). These strategies emerge in the wake of the crisis of Fordism from, roughly, the mid-1970s.  
A core element of the post-Fordist accumulation regime, according to Jessop, is the knowledge-based 
economy (KBE); this he defines as one where knowledge is being created, diffused and deployed in 
accelerated ways through ICTs; where increasingly sophisticated products codify and manage knowledge; 
and where there is a perception of knowledge as a strategic asset for individuals, firms and nations. Jessop 
views the KBE as a dominant, albeit heterogeneous, hegemonic paradigm and strategic guide for economic, 
political and social restructuring, owing to the importance attributed to knowledge in the post-Fordist 
socio-economic regime (Jessop 2005). 
The post-Fordist paradigm and the KBE, Jessop argues, bring major repercussions on the role of the state 
and politics in helping secure some of the conditions for profitable accumulation, the reproduction of 
labour power, the management of the spatial and temporal horizons of capital accumulation, as well as on 
the relationship between government and governance (Jessop 2000).  
Fordism went hand in hand with an ideal type of statehood, which Jessop calls Keynesian Welfare National 
State (KWNS). The new model of the state, according to Jessop is a ‘Schumpeterian competition state’ 
operating within the above mentioned post-Fordist SWPR, which comprises the following dimensions: 
a. In terms of capital accumulation, it is Schumpeterian, as it promotes innovation and flexibility in 
open economies by supply-side interventions to achieve structural and systemic competitiveness; 
the KBE is the central concept informing accumulation strategies and the Schumpeterian 
competition state plays a major role ‘in the material and discursive constitution of the globalising, 
networked, knowledge-based economy that its activities are seeking to govern’ (Jessop 2002, p.95). 
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b. In terms of reproduction of labour power, it is workfare, as it seeks to accommodate the demands 
for labour market flexibility and economic competitiveness in the globalising knowledge-based 
economy, exerting downward pressures on wages and relegating social policy and social spending 
to a secondary position, as well as investing in education and training to create an autonomous and 
flexible workforce with emphasis on knowledge skills, entrepreneurship and lifelong learning.  
c. In terms of the spatial and temporal scales involved in its activities, it is postnational, as the 
national scale has become less important in what concerns economic and social policies, which are 
increasingly managed by new multilevel governance regimes; this relativisation of scale might 
involve international organisations, intergovernmental fora, arrangements like the EU and its 
relevant imposition of norms and regulations or the devolution of social an economic policy to 
regional urban and local actors and institutions, though the national retains a significant role in all 
of the above 
d. In terms of the mode of government and policy-making, it is a regime, in the sense that a number 
of policies are administered by non-state mechanisms and actors; these include public-private 
partnerships organised at different levels, from the local to the supranational, neo-corporatist 
arrangements, as well as networking and other forms of self-organisation, which convey more of a 
picture of governance, as opposed to traditional government (Jessop 2002, 2005). 
2.2 The state and the IS/KBE 
Historically, new growth trajectories have relied on increased state direction for the management of the 
socio-economic transition (Perrons 2004); the Schumpeterian competition state, as mentioned, plays a 
significant role both in the realisation (in material and discursive terms) of the globalised KBE, as well as in 
its governance. Despite the predominance of the economic in the post-Fordist paradigm, these governance 
functions that the state is called upon to undertake are not only economic, but essentially involve the 
socio-political sphere in the light of new problems of social cohesion and social conflict as they appear in 
the transition to the IS/KBE (Jessop 2005). 
As knowledge is central in the IS/KBE, states are keen to promote its production and diffusion, and to 
exploit and expand the provision of intellectual resources. In addition, knowledge management becomes a 
significant function in governance processes. This involves the management of the idiosyncratic and 
contradictory character of information/knowledge, which can be taken both as a factor of production and 
as a public good: on the one hand, intellectual property is the key source of profit in the IS/KBE, on the 
other the production of knowledge is dependent on the intellectual commons, the social basis and the 
public availability of knowledge (Jessop 2000). This contradiction has been previously acknowledged and 
the need for states to design knowledge investment policies to benefit society has been emphasised (e.g. 
Bell 1979).  
States are therefore called upon to promote the commodification of knowledge (through patents, 
copyright, licenses) so as to turn it into a source for profit, but also to guarantee an intellectual commons 
basis for achieving competitive advantage of the economy on the whole and for building social capital and 
the learning society. It is in this vein that some or all of the following functions of the state can be 
understood: development of infrastructures (including broadband), content and services for the IS/KBE, 
regulation of activity in cyberspace, transformation of national utility structures to more flexible and 
competitive arrangements, links between university research and business needs, provision of platforms 
for education, lifelong learning and knowledge skills (Jessop 2005). Moreover, states assume discursive 
functions (including advertising campaigns, pilot projects etc). related to the promotion of the IS/KBE as 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991)  
Different states assume different knowledge management policies, others promoting intellectual property 
and knowledge privatisation, others seeking to preserve (and enhance) intellectual commons and 
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knowledge-sharing with the intention of protecting social capital embedded in communities by promoting 
innovation, designing apposite institutions etc. (Jessop 2001).  
This suggests that within the SWPR and the competition state model there are certain degrees of 
differentiation. Jessop indeed acknowledges the variable positioning of different states as far as the IS 
project is concerned, as well as the different institutional arrangements in which the IS/KBE project is 
encased. He recommends empirically informed research which would unravel in a national context the 
structural coupling between each type of Fordism and the character of the national state, the complexities 
of the capital relation, as well as, the problems occurring when the state does not have the capacity to 
manage the transition (Jessop 2002, p.139).   
Drawing on these points, I argue that the ‘competition state’ is a necessary but not sufficient model for 
capturing the role of the state in the information age. Specifically, I claim that if a sustainable IS/KBE is 
understood as a socio-economic formation characterised by economic development, but also social 
cohesion (as often emphasised in the IS rhetoric), then the state is called upon not only to function as an 
agent of competition, but, in different terms, to operate also in a developmental way, at least in certain 
national contexts.  
As a measure of the effectiveness of the state as developmental agent, I am using the concept of 
‘embedded autonomy’, coined by Peter Evans, which purports to overcome a perceived division between 
state autonomy and state embeddedness into the social structural context. In this conceptualisation, 
autonomy refers to the degree to which state elites and bureaucracies shape policies that are above the 
interests of their members; Evans claims that the more state bureaucracies approach Weber’s ideal type 
(i.e. based on meritocratic recruitment, secure careers and rewards, independence from external 
interferences) the more coherent they are, and this gives them a certain kind of autonomy and enables 
them to contribute to economic development (Evans 1995). 
In addition, and unlike Weber’s conceptualisation, state apparatuses should not be insulated from external 
interference (from business, church, military etc); on the contrary, they should be ‘embedded in a concrete 
set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual 
negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies’ (ibid., p.12); and it is only through embeddedness into 
society that state policies can have successful developmental outcomes (Form 1997; Hobson 1998). 
Based on comparative research, Evans argues that the ways in which states are coupled with their societies 
vary significantly and this impacts on the role of the state in the economy, which can be either 
developmental or detrimental to economic development (or a mixture of both).  Further, he claims that 
successful state involvement in the economy presupposes an understanding of the limits of state action, as 
well as a realistic positioning in the global economy with close societal links (Evans 1995).   
In the light of the above, then, I am interested in evaluating the role of the Greek state in the recent  IS 
policies which can be taken to demonstrate the IS/KBE project in Greece, by taking advantage of the 
analytical value of both the competition state framework and the developmental concept of embedded 
autonomy. In doing so, I will necessarily resort to what both Jessop and Evans refer to, namely the 
state/society coupling, as developed historically in Greece and as crystallized in a set of characteristics. 
3 THE STATE AND THE IS/KBE IN THE GREEK CONTEXT 
3.1 An overview of IS policy in Greece 
The seeds of a Greek IS agenda in the making date back in the 1980s, when the so-called ‘Mediterranean 
Integrated Programmes’ (1983-1993) were used for IT funding. In this context, 25 billion drachmas were 
invested with the intention of ‘jumping on’ the IT bandwagon. During this period, mainly universities and 
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research centres but also to some extent the public sector, as well as SMEs became aware of the new 
technologies.  
The first policy document regarding the IS in Greece was a White Paper titled ‘The Greek Strategy for an 
Information Society: A Tool for Employment, Development and Quality of Life’ (1995), which served as a 
means of setting the IS agenda in the Greek context. It echoed the discourse of opportunity associated with 
ICTs, as well as the dangers of being left behind, and it presented the whole issue as a great challenge for 
Greece. It was mainly concerned with the inadequate national infrastructure, which limited electronic 
transactions and access to new products and services both for firms and for households in comparison with 
the other EU countries. Most of its actions were funded by the 2nd Community Support Framework (CSF), 
including the development of a national infrastructure linking universities, technological institutes and 
public research institutes and the promotion of an e-commerce environment for business with the 
establishment of a National Committee on Electronic Commerce (Constantelou 2001). 
The operational programme Kleisthenis (1994-2000) run by the Ministry of Interiors, Public Administration 
and Decentralisation and with a total budget of 100 billion drachmas was the main IS initiative of that 
period. The central aim of the programme was the modernisation of public administration (both in terms of 
hardware procurement and regarding services and training of employees). The programme adopted an 
integrated approach to IT, including development of infrastructures, applications and training in the design 
and implementation of each separate project. In the case of large projects, project management was 
supported by large consultancy firms. Information systems for municipalities, fiscal administration (TAXIS), 
the stock market, customs, as well as training of public administrators were some of the basic initiatives. In 
parallel, digitisation of the public telecomms operator (OTE) network, the development of certain fibre 
optic rings, and the creation of the national network for research and technology (EDET) were important 
initiatives at the level of telecommunications infrastructure. During this period a small number of 
significant IT firms developed, while the IT sector was consolidated and entered the Athens stock market 
(Papakonstantinou 2005). 
The main development related to ICTs in the 1990s in Greece was the liberalisation of the 
telecommunication sector. Until the late 1980s the telecommunication sector in Greece (and in Europe at 
large), had been based on a state monopoly in the provision of telephone and telecommunication services 
provided by the incumbent Greek Telecommunications Organisation (OTE). Following the early EU IS 
documents, a series of laws carried forward the liberalisation of telecommunications, beginning with value-
added services and mobile telephony services (Law 1892/90 and 2075/92); after 31 December 2000 all 
restrictions including those on the provision of voice telephony and the network infrastructure were 
removed and full competition was officially established (although OTE kept a de facto dominant position in 
fixed telephony), under the supervision of a new, independent regulatory authority, the National 
Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT) (OECD 2001). 
In April 1999, a second White Paper was prepared by ten policy experts and advisors to the Prime Minister, 
based on international experience and feedback from the Ministries regarding the actions and steps that 
had been taken vis-à-vis the IS. This was more strategic and comprehensive and was titled ‘Greece in the 
Information Society: Strategy and Actions’. It emphasised the potential of ICTs for competitiveness and 
better public services, present in the early EU documents, together with the requirement of building 
human skills to take advantage of these opportunities. The imperative of universal access and the 
prevention of new types of social exclusion, reminiscent of similar concerns in EU documents, were also 
highlighted (Hellenic Republic 1999). 
The EU Lisbon summit in March 2000 emphasised the challenges of a transition to a knowledge society 
facing Europe and the need to set up a competitive platform that would at the same time sustain the 
European social model, maintaining social cohesion and cultural diversity (Council of the European Union 
2000). The declared aim was (and is) to develop a knowledge economy with social cohesion and to promote 
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convergence in Europe by means of ‘knowledge policies’, namely policies regarding: knowledge creation 
(supporting basic and applied research, the culture industries, promoting interchanges between different 
cultures and groups); knowledge diffusion (promoting broadband networks, Internet access, content 
industries, education reforms); knowledge utilisation (supporting product and process innovation, 
knowledge management and learning in firms and public organisations, international partnerships for 
innovation) (Rodrigues 2003). These aims were subsequently expressed in the ensuing eEurope 2002, 
eEurope 2005 and i2010 plans. 
In order to achieve the above goals, the Lisbon summit established a new open method of inter-state 
coordination for the acceleration of the translation of European goals into national policies. This method 
was supposed to combine European coherence with respect for national diversity. It operated by firstly 
setting European guidelines in each policy domain, then identifying best practices and reference indicators 
and, finally, leading to national plans consisting of concrete targets in accordance with each nation’s case 
(Rodrigues 2002).  
Following from the White Paper, the Lisbon summit and the Feira summit of June 2000, the Greek 
government proposed a systematic ‘Operational Programme for the Information Society’ (OPIS), linking it 
to funds within the structure of the third European Community Support Framework. This was an innovative 
horizontal programme, involving a number of government departments, and aiming to implement the 
essential features of the 1999 White Paper. Reflecting the EU rhetoric, as expressed in the Lisbon agenda 
and the eEurope initiative, the OPIS set as objectives over the period 2000-2006: a) to provide better 
services to the citizen and improve the quality of life through the deployment of ICTs in public 
administration, health and welfare, transport and the environment, b) to promote development and build 
human potential through actions to increase competitiveness and employment and to put into place a 
suitable educational system (Constantelou 2001). To do so, it sets out the following four lines of action 
(with the corresponding shares of the total national and EU funding):  
 Education and culture (17 per cent), which addresses issues of IT infrastructure and content, Internet 
connectivity for all primary and secondary institutions by 2001, training for teachers in IT resources as 
educational tools, promoting Greek cultural heritage 
 Citizens and quality of life (37 per cent), focusing on the improvement of public services to citizens by 
connecting central, regional and local public administration, developing online applications, training of 
public sector employees in ICTs, reforming the management of health and welfare services, introducing 
telematics applications  
 Digital economy and employment (24 per cent), encouraging use of ICTs by SMEs, improving conditions 
for high-tech business start-ups, intensifying university-industry links, introducing ICT-related training 
programmes for the wider population, creating digital content 
 Communications (19 per cent), including measures to enhance liberalization, development of local-
access network infrastructure, promotion of broadband services for the public sector, facilitating access 
for remote areas and disadvantaged groups (OPIS 2000) 
 Technical Support (3 per cent)  
 (Ministry of National Economy 2000) 
3.2 The Greek state as competition state and the Greek IS 
During the period 1998-2006, and through the introduction of the OPIS the Greek state has  acted as a 
‘Schumpeterian competition state’ within a ‘Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime’ as in Jessop’s 
conceptualisation. Through its 1998-2006 IS policies, the Greek state has undertaken the role of promoting 
the IS/KBE in both material and discursive terms within a SWPR, which: 
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a. has attempted to promote innovation by supply-side interventions and has played the key role in 
material and discursive promotion of the globally-informed IS/KBE 
b. has sought to accommodate labour market flexibility and economic competitiveness, and in 
particular has placed great emphasis on education and training with the intention of building a 
knowledge-skilled workforce, as well enterprises competent in the KBE both at the central and at 
the municipal and local level 
c. has been postnational, constructed around the EU and its member states, so as to promote a 
European IS/KBE in accordance with the Lisbon agenda and the related eEurope policies and 
adopting an open method of coordination leaving important steps to be decided at the national 
level, as well as involving other international institutional arrangements and sub-national and local 
actors and institutions 
d. has been a governance, rather than a government, regime, involving as it has non-state 
mechanisms, corporate and industrial actors (e.g. IT firms and their representative association 
SEPE, civil society organisations, professionals, and other experts). 
The Greek state can be seen as an entity within this SWPR, or more specifically, as a ‘Schumpeterian 
competition state’ within this SWPR. Through its IS policies in the period under examination, the Greek 
state has played the key role in promoting the IS/KBE in the national context both in material and in 
discursive terms and has attempted to manage the socio-economic transition to the IS/KBE. In doing so, it 
has anchored its activities and policies in international developments involving different spatial scales, 
notably by following the spirit of EU directives and policies for the IS/KBE, and has also sought to involve 
national, sub-national and local government units. In addition, it has operated in an environment of other 
state and non-state mechanisms, including for instance its interest in evolving public-private partnerships. 
In adopting the role of Schumpeterian competition state, the Greek state has absorbed in its approach (as 
demonstrated in the 1999 White Paper and the OPIS) the international shifts in economic discourse that 
have been taking place since the 1990s: emphasis on flexibility, lifelong learning, and most importantly 
emphasis on knowledge as an engine for growth and productivity. Moreover, the Greek state has provided 
new regulatory frameworks which are taken to be more suitable in the new economic order. This process 
has involved adjustment to EU regulatory imperatives and directives, albeit with difficulties and delays in 
certain cases, not least regarding the telecommunications liberalisation framework and the resistances 
generated by the incumbent OTE. Further, it has institutionalised new and autonomous regulatory 
institutions, notably  EETT.   
Further, and in accordance with Jessop’s outline of the role of the state in the IS/KBE, the Greek state has 
not limited its activities to the economic sphere, but has sought (through its IS strategy) to address the 
whole socio-political sphere and the problems of social cohesion and social conflict as they re-emerge in 
the IS/KBE and in particular as they are recoined in the prism of knowledge management (as knowledge has 
become the acknowledged central asset for economic growth and social development).  
Our empirical study has shown that as far as its IS/KBE strategy goes, the Greek state has been paying 
attention not only to ‘competition’ aspects, but also to more developmental sides of the IS/KBE project. 
The acknowledged importance of knowledge has indeed been demonstrated in the centrality of the 
management of knowledge through IS policies. The approach of the Greek state has been one trying to 
balance the commodification of knowledge, through emphasis on intellectual property regimes, with 
intellectual commons, the social basis and public availability of knowledge.  
Indeed, there have been cases showing that the Greek policy-makers have promoted the social character of 
knowledge and its availability to all. The example of education has been characteristic in this respect, at 
least as far as infrastructure is concerned, as all primary and secondary institutions have been provided 
with PCs and have been connected to the Internet early on in the programme. Moreover, in the area of 
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higher education the deployment of the infrastructure of EDET on the one hand, together with equal access 
to funding granted to all universities and technological institutions has resulted in state-of-the-art ICT 
infrastructure for all such educational institutions, regardless of their geographical location, prestige or 
quality of study offered; this clearly has not been the case in other countries, where access to 
infrastructures has rather been determined by market forces operating under rationalities of demand, cost, 
and profit. 
 In the area of broadband, the relevant White Paper of 2002 reveals the need for the state to stimulate 
the broadband market by means of appropriate policies: ‘The rapid development of appropriate, 
generally accessible and affordable broadband infrastructure and the development of relevant 
applications and services must be set as a top priority for the State. The above national infrastructure, 
coupled with international broadband connections, is a necessary step in bridging the "digital divide" 
among citizens, both within and between regions of Greece, thus providing opportunities and potential 
for regional development of local communities up to a common European standard. The development 
and use of broadband services by the Public Administration, particularly in the sectors of Education and 
Health, could be a major enabler in raising awareness and ensuring penetration of these services across 
the State, promoting their use to citizens and businesses. The State, by actively promoting the 
development of broadband infrastructures and services can be a catalyst in Greece towards the targets 
laid down in the European Initiative eEurope 2005’ (White Paper on Broadband  2002). 
 At the sub-national level, there have been significant initiatives involving public/private partnerships for 
the absorption of ICTs in municipalities. In 2004, for instance, the Central Union of Greek Municipalities 
and Communities (KEDKE) undertook a strategic initiative for the formulation of a development strategy 
so as to advance the IS/KBE at the local level. This initiative has been carried out in conjunction with a 
relevant research group on IS/KBE at the National Technical University of Athens and PETA SA, a 
consultancy firm for local development. There have also been examples of ‘digital cities’ where a digital 
platform has been in use, notably the cities of Trikala (e-trikala.gr) and Amaroussion (maroussi2004.gr). 
The Greek state has also demonstrated considerable eagerness to help enterprises enter the digital era 
(through the ‘Go-Online’ and ‘eBusiness’ initiatives) and thus to stimulate demand in the private sector 
through public procurement processes. In 2003 92 per cent of firms with 11-250 employees possessed PCs 
(94 per cent in the EU), 82 per cent were connected to the Internet (83 per cent in the EU), while 48 per 
cent had also a website (52 per cent in the EU). These tendencies were reinforced through the “eBusiness” 
action of the OPIS, resulting in an 87 per cent Internet connection in 2004 (90 per cent for the EU-15) (EDET 
2005). Very small enterprises (up to 10 employees) were significantly behind the EU average in 2002, but by 
2006 had increased their Internet connectivity substantially (72.4 per cent) (Observatory for Greek IS 2008). 
3.3 The Greek state as developmental state in the Greek IS 
However, and despite the developmental aspects of the strategy and the undeniable stories of successful 
completion of certain projects of the Greek state, the overall impression is that the IS in Greece has faced 
serious implementation problems (Caloghirou and Constantelou 2006). These have been reflected in the 
following picture of ICT diffusion in Greece, as captured by some basic indicators. In 2006 Greece presented 
the lowest percentages in EU-25 in the following indicators: Internet usage at least once a week by 
individuals (25.8 per cent compared to 47 per cent for EU-25), Internet access by households (23 per cent 
compared to 52 per cent for EU-25), as well as Internet usage for interaction with public authorities (9 per 
cent of the population over 15 in 2006, compared to 26 per cent for EU-25). It also occupied one of the last 
positions in PC usage among the population (37 per cent in 2006). Internet access among enterprises was 
about 94 per cent (93 per cent for EU-25), but broadband access was 58 per cent (74 per cent for EU-25). 
Perhaps the most dramatic part of the picture emerges in broadband Internet access by households (4 per 
cent), which was the lowest percentage even in the EU-27 (i.e. including also Romania and Bulgaria) 
(Eurostat 2007). 
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Moreover, in 2006, the overall Internet use in the Greek population presented certain digital divide 
patterns in terms of sex, age, educational level and geographical location: 
i) The percentage of 36.1 per cent for men was contrasted with 24.4 per cent for women.  
ii) Very low use was observed in the 46-55 age group (20.4 per cent) and the 56-65 group (8 per cent), 
compared to 55.6 per cent in the 16-25 group. 
iii) Only 1.7 per cent of men and women with primary education, and 35.5 with secondary education were 
connected, compared to 65.5 per cent of the population with higher education. 
iv)The lowest usage was recorded in the Thessaly municipality (17.7 per cent) and the highest in the Athens 
municipality (35.4 per cent) (Observatory for Greek IS 2008) 
In Peter Evans’s conceptualisation, the ideal type of the developmental state incorporates the pillars of 
‘embeddedness’ and  ‘autonomy’, which Evans link in his notion of ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans 1995). In 
his discussion of the IT sector in Korea, India and Brazil, Evans attributes the different technological 
trajectories to different state structures and different state-society relations. In the case of Korea, a robust 
and coherent bureaucratic apparatus and its dense ties to private industrial capital is seen as the source of 
technological progress. The network ties between state and firms have been crucial in developing local IT 
capabilities.  
By contrast, in India, the state/industry relation, at least in the beginning, has been characterised by Evans 
as ‘aloof’ and ‘semi-adversarial’ and not conducive to local IT development. Last, in the Brazilian case, the 
state was better connected with local entrepreneurs, but its fragmentation presented obstacles in 
following a programme of transformation and in using the links with local firms effectively; while individual 
state agencies were cohesive, the overall state apparatus was ‘badly divided’ as a result the Brazilian state 
was not autonomous enough and this was exemplified in its inability to prevent free rider activity (Evans 
1995). 
While embeddedness in the above examples refers to links between bureaucracy and private capital, in 
Evans’s subsequent reconceptualisation it is extended and includes multiple groups (i.e. civil society as 
well).  
Following Evans’s approach, the state structures and the state/society relations in Greece have been  
presenting the following dimensions, which can be linked with aspects of the evolution of the IS/KBE 
project in the Greek context. 
Firstly, bureaucracy in Greece has historically been quite fragmented, with lack of expertise and coherence 
within public authorities and agencies and wide divisions across agencies. Public administration has been 
systematically subject to abusive interventions by successive governments for purposes of bureaucratic 
clientelism, something which has prevented the development of a Weberian bureaucratic culture based on 
rational/legal expertise (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002).  
Following from this, there has been observed an overall incapacity of the state to carry out, monitor and 
implement certain IT projects, due to limited experience on the part of the design, implementation, 
monitoring and management mechanisms, as well as in the unbalanced distribution of personnel and 
resources. As a central figure of the OPIS Management Authority remarked, “The most obvious reason for 
this has been the lack of project management personnel both capable and aware of the contours of the 
Greek reality that could navigate through a labyrinth of problems and procedures”. On the other hand, as a 
senior member of a large IT firm put it: “Implementation has also been impeded by the complexity of the 
legal, administrative and institutional framework for IT projects. Certain administrative procedures (e.g. 
procedures for acquiring funding) have continued to be quite complicated”. This seems to have 
characterised public procurement mechanisms as a whole, reflecting the fragmentation of public 
administration that has been formed historically.  
1205 
Overall, the public sector has presented inadequacies as provider of digital products and advanced 
applications, as well as consumer of digital products and services. According to a former member of the 
Special Secretariat, “there has been fragmentation within public organisations, perpetuation of quite 
obsolete structures (e.g. different departments for telephony, IT and Internet, and different departments 
dealing with procurement for those technologies), inflexible institutional frameworks which were only 
suitable for large public projects”. Incorporation of a project in the daily administrative routines has been 
particularly difficult as lack of understanding and motivation on the part of employees.  
Secondly, state/economy relations have been historically characterised by over-regulation and strict legal 
frameworks on the one hand, while suffering on the other from relations of mutual dependence which 
involve corruption and patronage in the allocation of favours and contracts; further, the links between 
state and entrepreneurs at the local level have been weak. 
Unlike national cases where large ICT firms have acted as leading edge technological innovators (e.g. Nokia 
in Finland) the IT sector in Greece has been characterised by a very small number of large firms and a vast 
majority of small and very small enterprises. The IT sector has not been competitive and capable of 
developing integrated IT solutions; the relationships of dependence of firms on the state observed in the 
industrial era have been reproduced in phenomena whereby the IT firms, have relied extensively on state 
promises for funding. As an advisor to a former Special Secretary remarked, “In most countries, the IT 
sector pushes the public sector forward, while here this does not happen, on the contrary often the public 
sector needs to make the IT sector aware of developments. This is reflected in the way the market deals 
with projects: it does not create its own dynamic, but expects the state to generate projects”. Moreover, as 
a former OPIS Management Authority expert remarked “a vicious circle between the IT sector and the 
public procurement system” has been observed, dominated by phenomena of micro-corruption, “whereby 
an IT firm would bribe a member of a committee deciding on the purchase of an IT solution”. In other 
cases, “large, hegemonic IT firms were in a position to determine the specifications of a project due to their 
political connections”. This has been confirmed by other state actors, as well as representatives of the IT 
sector in further interviews. 
On the other hand, as several IT sector representatives have claimed, “Implementation has been impeded 
by the complexity of the legal, administrative and institutional framework for IT projects” (but also 
characterising public procurement mechanisms as a whole). Certain administrative procedures (e.g. 
procedures for acquiring funding) have been quite complicated, reflecting the fragmentation of public 
administration. 
Thirdly, formal civil society (measured in terms of organisations and participation rates) has been arguably 
limited and its organisations often dependent on state mechanisms; importantly, interest mediation has 
been characterised by a potent rent-seeking behaviour from sectional interests, which reveals a civil society 
strong in its appropriating potential; and the state/business/labour industrial relations have shown a 
‘disjointed corporatism’, whereby labour unions tend to be patronised by the state and the political parties, 
while the policy capacities of the state regarding business are weak, a situation which accounts for the fact 
‘that social dialogue in Greece remains an exercise with a limited scope’  (Lavdas 2005, p.298). 
As a result, there has been a lack of social consensus as to what the information society involves at the 
societal level and what its objectives are. This is owing to the generally recognized fact that there has not 
been so far a social dialogue between political authorities and implementation mechanisms on the one 
hand and citizens, firms and social forces on the other for identification of goals and priorities in a kind of 
consultative process. And this seems to be a historical trend as well, as it has been observed that the 
programmes of all CSFs, including the OPIS, have been operating through the interaction of state 
mechanisms and experts with IT sector players, but without clear priorities regarding the societal level and 
without the building of social consensus towards these priorities. Notwithstanding the role of certain 
professional associations that have promoted IS developments in Greece (e.g. the Greek Technical 
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Chamber TEE, or the Greek Association of Information Technology and Communications Scientists and 
Professionals EPY) and enthusiastic individuals (e.g. the team behind EDET), these activities have not 
managed to link the vision and knowledge of certain individual or team experts with broader societal 
structures and mechanisms of diffusion.  
4 CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing on recent theorisations linking the IS/KBE paradigm and the transformation of the functions of the 
nation-state, the paper has argued for the importance of the state and its mechanisms for the sustainability 
of the IS/KBE. In particular, it has drawn on a generic model of ‘competition state’ and has attempted to 
outline the ways in which it is involved in the establishment of the IS/KBE paradigm. Going beyond this 
model, however, I have also argued that the imperative for a sustainable IS/KBE (present in the IS/KBE, not 
least in the EU) calls for a more developmental role for the state. 
Empirically, the paper has drawn on the Greek case of IS/KBE ,which has been in the making since the 
1980s, but notably since 2000, when a comprehensive IS strategy was put forward by the Greek state in 
deliberation with the EU administration and following the EU policy objectives. My research has revealed a 
picture of limited ICT diffusion and deployment at the societal overall compared to the other EU countries, 
despite a clear articulation of a strategy and despite an active ‘competition state’ operating within a 
Schumpeterian Postnational Workfare Regime, namely the EU, in Jessop’s theorisation. This picture has 
also shown the limitations of the ‘competition state’ model in accounting for the establishment of a solid 
IS/KBE at the national level. This model has therefore been complemented by deploying that of the 
developmental state, as conceptualised and applied by Evans, and by examining the state/society coupling 
in Greece. This has provided an explanation of the current situation of IS/KBE in Greece, which through the 
language of ‘embedded autonomy’, can be summarised as follows: on the one hand implementation of 
policy has been enmeshed in various personal and institutional interests, clientelistic relations and micro-
corruption (lack of autonomy of the state from society); on the other hand the IS project has been designed 
top-down without social dialogue and with subsequent limited mobilisation of civil society, while the links 
between state and IT entrepreneurs have been weak and presenting problematic aspects (inadequate 
embeddedness of state into society). 
Overall, the paper has adopted a critical stance to simplified models of state transformation. It has sought 
to combine an analytical framework of state transformation with an empirical experience of IS building and 
the role of the state in the process. In doing so it has ultimately claimed that the role of the state in a 
sustainable information society is both significant and possibly differentiated across national contexts in 
accordance with their historical societal legacies; these can be captured through a socio-historical approach 
looking into the state/society coupling of any national case under examination.  
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